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Private politics in the garden of England: An atypical case of anti-wind farm contention 
Abstract 
This article analyses an atypical case of anti-wind farm contention at Marden in south-east England. 
Anti-wind farm campaigns have typically sought to resist developments through planning 
iŶstitutioŶs. Though foĐusiŶg oŶ plaŶŶiŶg, the MaƌdeŶ Đase suĐĐessfullǇ puƌsued a ͚pƌiǀate politiĐs͛ 
strategy, pressuring businesses (e.g. developer, investors and landowner) to withdraw their support 
and commitment. Drawing on 10 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, and extensive 
doĐuŵeŶtaƌǇ aŶalǇsis, this aƌtiĐle desĐƌiďes aŶd eǆplaiŶs this atǇpiĐal Đase. It aƌgues that MaƌdeŶ͛s 
pƌiǀate politiĐs iŶǀolǀed stƌategiĐ fƌaŵiŶg that aligŶed ǁith ďusiŶesses͛ Đlaiŵs to corporate social 
and environmental responsibility. Though directly persuading companies on these terms failed, 
ǁheŶ the ĐaŵpaigŶ ͚ǁeŶt puďliĐ͛, eĐoŶoŵiĐ aĐtoƌs ǁithdƌeǁ suppoƌt. MaƌdeŶ͛s tƌajeĐtoƌǇ aŶd 
outcome are explained via resources and context particular to the case, and the potential 
reputational damage associated with its framing strategy. The article ends by noting interesting 
relationships and parallels between private politics and state focused local contention. 
Keywords: corporate social and environmental responsibility, frame alignment, local campaigns, 
outcomes, strategy, wind energy. 
Dr Matthew Ogilvie 






This article explores a case of wind farm siting contention situated around the picturesque village of 
Marden in the county of Kent, (the garden of) England. Though analysis of wind energy siting conflict 
is not new (e.g. Gipe 1995: chapter 8), the Marden case is of particular interest as it demonstrates 
the pƌaĐtiĐe aŶd iŵpaĐt of ͚pƌiǀate politiĐs͛ ;BaƌoŶ ϮϬϬϯͿ,i in an area of socio-political contention that 
typically revolves around, and gets resolved through, formal political institutions, in particular, 
planning systems (Szarka and Blühdorn 2006). The use of private politics at Marden involved a 
successful campaign that focused on persuading and pressuring businesses (e.g. the developer, 
landowner and investors) associated with a proposed development to withdraw their support. This 
strategic approach is atypical of anti-windfarm campaigns, and the case therefore advances our 
understanding of this arena of contention. 
Conflict over siting wind energy developments can be subsumed within the broader category of 
contentious politiĐs. CoŶteŶtious politiĐs iŶǀolǀes ŵoďilisatioŶ ďǇ ͚oƌdiŶaƌǇ people – often in alliance 
ǁith ŵoƌe iŶflueŶtial ĐitizeŶs…iŶ ĐoŶfƌoŶtatioŶ ǁith elites, authoƌities aŶd oppoŶeŶts͛ ;Taƌƌoǁ ϮϬϭϭ: 
31). It is a broad concept that captures various forms of non-institutional politics, including 
revolutions, social movements, and individual campaigns. Contentious politics involves efforts to 
affect or resist change outside formal political processes ;e.g. eleĐtioŶsͿ ǀia ͚alteƌŶatiǀe͛ ŵeaŶs ;fƌoŵ 
petitioning to demonstrations to political violence), though demands are often directed towards 
formal political institutions (i.e. the state) in efforts to realize aims. Contentious politics takes place 
at various levels, including, the transnational, national, regional, and local (Rootes 1999).  
Non-institutional efforts to resist the siting of wind-energy developments by ordinary citizens within 
their communities is one example of local contentious politics, which typically, though not 
exclusively (see Carter 2007: 155-60), involves geographically contained and temporally limited 
campaigns on narrowly defined issues, from housing provision (Markham 2005: 670) to the 
perceived threats of asylum seekers (Hubbard 2005) to a wide variety of specific local environmental 
concerns (e.g. unwanted waste or fracking infrastructure). Local mobilization can be usefully 
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compared to national oriented social movements, which tend to involve generalized aiŵs ;ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
liberation, racial equality etc.), geographically diffuse networks that are sustained over relatively 
long periods of time, and which alternate between periods of relative quiet and intense activity 
commonly characterized in terms of waves or cycles (Koopmans 2007). Though revolutions and 
social movements are the most salient forms of non-institutional politics, local conflict makes up a 
significant proportion of all political contention (Rootes 1999: 290). It is therefore notable that this 
aƌea ͚[has] ďeeŶ ƌelatiǀelǇ ŶegleĐted iŶ the sĐieŶtifiĐ liteƌatuƌe͛ ;‘ootes 2007: 723), which has tended 
to focus on the analysis of national social movements (“Ŷoǁ et al. ϮϬϬϳͿ. GiǀeŶ this ͚ƌelatiǀe ŶegleĐt͛, 
the following case also contributes to the broader literature on local contention.   
This article questions whether the Marden campaign represents an atypical example of anti-wind 
farm contention, and seeks to explain this case: Is Marden atypical, and if so, in what ways? How can 
we explain the development of this campaign? And what can the case tell us about community 
resistance to wind farms and local contention more generally? In addressing these questions, the 
article is based on in-depth analysis of a single case using predominantly qualitative data.ii The data 
draws on 10 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders (activist, landowner, developer and local 
authority), extensive use of campaign archives (digital and hard copy), and other documentary 
sources (e.g. government and developer websites and publications). Interviewees were purposively 
selected, and interviews were conducted while the campaign was ongoing,iii with the exception of 
two follow-up interviews with two key actors (the campaign group leader and landowner), which 
were carried out after the case was resolved.iv To ensure the robustness of findings, the 
triangulation of data sources (particularly between interviews and documentary sources) has 
featured strongly in the following analysis. Before empirical analysis can begin however, it is first 
necessary to conceptually and empirically situate the article. We turn first therefore to a discussion 
of private politics, before selectively considering research into local wind energy conflict. The article 
then moves on to a descriptive overview of the case, before demonstrating and explaining its 
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distinctiveness against the backdrop of typical anti-windfarm strategy. The article ends by making 
some connections between private political and state oriented contention.   
Private Politics 
Private politics is a form of contentious political action in which actors seek to redress grievances 
without looking to the state (Baron 2012; Büthe 2010). As Baron writes: 
͚Pƌiǀate politiĐs iŶĐludes diƌeĐt aĐtioŶ ďǇ oŶe paƌtǇ agaiŶst aŶotheƌ ǁithout ƌeĐouƌse to puďliĐ 
iŶstitutioŶs…The term private means that the parties do not rely on the law or public order; i.e., on 
law making or law enforcement, although both may be available. The term politics refers to 
individual and collective action in situations in which people attempt to further their interests by 
iŵposiŶg theiƌ ǁill oŶ otheƌs͛ ;ϮϬϬϯ: ϯϯ aŶd ϲϯͿ.  
As a form of political action that seeks to further interests outside of and without recourse to the 
state, pƌiǀate politiĐs has takeŶ, aŶd ĐoŶtiŶues to take plaĐe iŶ ǀaƌious ͚[a]ƌeŶas of civil 
soĐietǇ…[iŶĐludiŶg] ŵediĐiŶe, ƌeligioŶ, eduĐatioŶ, sĐieŶĐe, the ǁoƌkplaĐe, aŶd laďouƌ uŶioŶs͛ 
(Armstrong  and Bernstein 2008: 78).v Involving choices over the target of action, as well as tactics 
and timing (Ganz 2004), decisions over whether to adopt private or public (state-oriented) politics 
are ultimately strategic (Baron 2003: 34). However, the strategic adoption of private politics need 
not take place to the exclusion of state oriented contention or vice versa. Indeed, private politics can 
occur alongside mobilization that seeks redress via the state, as many of the post-ϭϵϲϬs ͚Ŷeǁ soĐial 
ŵoǀeŵeŶts͛ suĐh as lesďiaŶ/gaǇ, ǁoŵeŶ͛s aŶd eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal ŵoǀeŵeŶts attest ;AƌŵstƌoŶg aŶd 
Bernstein 2008: 78). 
Over the last few decades or so there has been an increasing academic focus on private politics as a 
form of contentious political action (de Bakker et al. 2013), as scholars have sought to move beyond 
the purportedly narrow state-ĐeŶtƌiĐ foĐus of the doŵiŶaŶt ͚politiĐal pƌoĐess͛ paƌadigŵ (Snow 2004; 
Armstrong and Bernstein 2008). Of the different expressions of private politics, mobilizations against 
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corporations has become an increasingly salient dimension, and will be the predominant focus from 
here on in. Though ͚Đoƌpoƌate ĐaŵpaigŶiŶg is Ŷot Ŷeǁ…it has ďeeŶ a gƌoǁiŶg pheŶoŵeŶoŶ iŶ 
ǀaƌious foƌŵs foƌ at least the last thiƌtǇ Ǉeaƌs͛ ;‘iĐketts: ϮϬϭϯ: ϲͿ.vi The rise in corporate campaigning 
has ďeeŶ liŶked to the iŶĐƌeasiŶg ͚pƌoŵiŶeŶĐe aŶd uďiƋuitǇ of ĐoƌpoƌatioŶs iŶ soĐial life…iŶ ƌeĐeŶt 
decades, making their interaction with movements and civil society groups even more critical for 
soĐietal ǁellďeiŶg͛ ;de Bakkeƌ et al. ϮϬϭϯ: ϱϳϳͿ. IŶ effeĐt, ĐoƌpoƌatioŶs haǀe ďeĐoŵe ͚doŵiŶaŶt 
goǀeƌŶaŶĐe iŶstitutioŶs [ǁhiĐh] has ŶeĐessitated a shift…that has seeŶ soĐial movements 
iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ foĐus theiƌ atteŶtioŶ oŶ pƌiǀate seĐtoƌ poǁeƌ holdeƌs͛ ;‘iĐketts: ϮϬϭϯ: ϲͿ.  
The tactics adopted by actors targeting corporations are manifold, ranging from lobbying to boycotts 
to (non-violent) direct action. The ĐeŶtƌal ͚logiĐ͛ of such tactics is to threaten or inflict negative 
economic consequences as a means of leǀeƌage; the ͚logiĐ of daŵage͛ ;della Porta and Diani 2006), 
not least via reputational harm and encouraging investors and consumers to withdraw their support 
(Vasi and King 2012Ϳ. IŶteƌestiŶglǇ, ͚[ŵ]aŶǇ fiƌŵs atteŵpt to aǀoid pƌiǀate politiĐs ďǇ pƌoaĐtiǀelǇ 
adoptiŶg poliĐies that ƌeduĐe the likelihood that theǇ ǁill ďeĐoŵe a taƌget͛ ;BaƌoŶ ϮϬϬϯ: ϯϲͿ. This 
can involve establishing corporate social and environmental responsibility practices that have the 
potential to militate against conflict stimulating negative externalities. It is also worth noting that 
such policies might also be instituted to give a company the veneer of ethical respectability without 
much substance beŶeath the ƌhetoƌiĐ, foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, thƌough the pƌaĐtiĐe of ͚gƌeeŶǁashiŶg͛ ;‘oǁell 
1996: 101-6). In either case, claims to be ethically responsible leaves corporations open to being 
held to account, and can lead to campaigners deploying arguments that mobilize ďusiŶesses͛ ethical 
discourse against them (Ricketts 2013Ϳ. “uĐh ͚fƌaŵe aligŶŵeŶt͛ strategies (Snow et al. 1986) are 
clearly evident in the Marden case under scrutiny in this article (see below). 
Beyond firms proactively avoiding conflict through the adoption of ethical policies, scholars have 
sought to understand the outcomes of observed instances of private politics. Notwithstanding the 
numerous ways of conceptualizing such outcomes and consequences in the social movement 
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literature (e.g. cultural, biographical, inter-movement, see Snow et al. 2007), the majority of studies 
have been concerned to understand the observed intended political impacts of mobilization (de 
Bakker 2013: 581). Though the range of such impacts can still be quite broad, including raising public 
awareness, the recognition of marginalized identities, policy gains, and institutional and structural 
change, the key question is whether or not movements or campaigns have achieved stated 
objectives. This will be the criterion for measuring outcomes in the case study considered below. 
Research into the intended outcomes of private politics campaigns highlights a mixed record, with 
perhaps failures outweighing successes (Baron 2003). Though highlighting that we tend to 
remember successful corporate campaigns, such as mobilization against apparel and footwear, 
BaƌoŶ aƌgues that ͚[i]f data ǁeƌe aǀailaďle oŶ all atteŵpts at pƌiǀate politiĐs…ŵost ǁould pƌoďaďlǇ 
ďe fouŶd to ďe failuƌes͛ ;ϮϬϬϯ: ϯϲͿ. IŶ additioŶ, ‘iĐketts (2013: 21) suggests that we tend to know 
more about corporate campaigning at the national and multinational level than at the local level. 
Clearly these are notable conclusions, as the current article seeks to analyse a local campaign that 
ended in an unqualified success through the deployment of corporate focused private politics. This 
current piece of research therefore provides the opportunity to analyse a successful instance of 
private politics at the local level. On these criteria alone the case study analysed might be considered 
atypical. However, to fully grasp the atypical nature of the campaign explored in this article, we need 
to turn to a consideration of research into the socio-politics of wind energy. Indeed, it is primarily in 
relation to this body of knowledge that the claim that Marden is atypical is made and substantiated.  
Anti-wind farm contention 
Social scientific analysis into the socio-politics of wind energy has, broadly speaking, generated two 
bodies of research (Jobert 2007): studies seeking to explain public attitudes towards (proposed) 
wind farms (Devine-Wright 2008; Hall et al. 2013) and analysis of outcomes over the siting of specific 
projects (Toke 2005; Ogilvie and Rootes 2015), or over the deployment of wind energy more 
generally within and across states (Toke et al. 2008). Both areas of research have significantly 
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contributed to our understanding of the development of wind energy, and research continues to 
date.  
In the UK (and elsewhere), local contention over wind farms has typically revolved around planning 
regimes, as supporters and opponents of developments have sought to influence the decisions of 
local and national level decision-makers over the siting of specific projects (Toke 2005; Szarka and 
Blühdorn 2006). The focus on planning by local objectors is partially conditioned by the open nature 
of planning systems in Britain to public input (Cowell and Owens 2006; note Rootes 2009 on waste 
incinerators), and the centrality of planning in decision-making processes. Seeing planning as the 
most realistic means of resisting developments, local opponents are willing to channel significant 
resources into oppositional campaigns. With a focus on influencing state institutions at the local 
level, anti-wind farm campaigns have typically been oriented towards public political contention. The 
following ideal-typical account of anti-wind farm strategy illustrates this.  
Strategically, local opponents of wind farms have adopted similar means in addressing grievances 
through planning regimes, particularly at the local authority level.vii Here, groups seek to directly 
persuade decision-makers of the inappropriateness of planned developments, while at the same 
time applying political pressure to locally elected decision-makers via the mobilization of local 
constituents (Toke, 2005; Ogilvie 2013; Ogilvie and Rootes, 2015). In relation to the former, 
campaigners present their arguments through various means including phone calls, emails, letters, 
aŶd ͚ƌeďuttal doĐuŵeŶts͛,viii as well as communicating concerns through the local media (e.g. press 
and radio). In relation to the latter, local residents and organizations (e.g. parish councils, local 
businesses) are encouraged to sign petitions and/or write letters to councils objecting to proposals. 
Such mobilization involves the provision of information via public meetings, leafletting communities, 
sending emails, and updating digital media (e.g. websites/Facebook), alongside efforts to raise the 
necessary finances to fund campaigns. Importantly, pre-existing and emergent networks between 
local campaign organisations facilitate the sharing of strategic information (Ogilvie 2013). Alongside 
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the centrality and openness of local planning structures, such networks help explain strategic 
similarities across campaigns.   
Clearly this is an ideal-typical account of strategic developments of local mobilization against 
planned wind energy schemes, and clearly it marginalises many factors in the emergence, 
development and outcomes of anti-wind energy campaigns we might have discussed, both in terms 
of similarities and differences (see Ogilvie 2013 for a 5 case comparison). However, the purpose of 
this brief account is to provide an analytical backdrop against which the atypical nature of the 
Marden campaign can be emphasised and scrutinised. The key message here is that anti-wind farm 
campaigns typically focus on resisting developments through the planning system, and thus adopt a 
strategic orientation towards those particular state institutions.  
As will become clear below, the Marden case does mirror, to an extent, the strategic characteristics 
just outlined. However, what sets this campaign apart is an accompanying robust and persistent 
oƌieŶtatioŶ toǁaƌd ͚pƌiǀate politiĐs͛, a stƌategiĐ appƌoaĐh that ultiŵatelǇ led to the suĐĐess of the 
campaign. Before turning to explain the success of private politics in this case, it is first necessary to 
provide a descriptive overview of the Marden case.  
Overview of the Marden campaign 
Marden is a small village situated on the Low Weald in Kent, south of Maidstone and east of 
Tunbridge Wells. It is located in a rural area of rolling hills, irregular fields, abundant hedges and 
woods, and scattered farmsteads, with numerous small villages in the surrounding area. The 
campaign at Marden began when selected local residents were informed by Maidstone Borough 
Council (MBC) of an application for an anemometer mast in May 2007.ix Though a local farmer had 
been looking into the viability of siting a single 127m turbine on his land with the development 
company Wind Direct for six months, this was the first time members of the local community 
became aware of the plans. As news spread of the application, a number of local residents wrote to 
the council to object, as did members of the local parish council at Goudhurst. However, in spite of 
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these efforts, the plans for the mast were approved by MBC in November 2007. With these plans 
approved, Wind Direct submitted an application for a single wind turbine the following month. 
Amongst the initial objectors to these plans was James Smith, a retired chartered accountant and 
investment banker who lived in Marden and who had a direct and clear view of the proposed 
development site from his back garden. Along with a number of concerned residents who also felt 
threatened by the proposal, Smith set up the Kentish Weald Action Group (KWAG) as a vehicle for 
ĐaŵpaigŶiŶg agaiŶst the ǁiŶd tuƌďiŶe appliĐatioŶ. The gƌoup ǁas offiĐiallǇ lauŶĐhed at a ƌesideŶts͛ 
meeting in December 2007. 
KWAG began by gathering information on windfarms and meeting regularly to discuss concerns and 
strategy. They then started informing residents within the local community primarily as a means of 
raising awareness and developing a membership base. As part of this process they leafleted 
surrounding villages, put up posters, lobbied local parish councils and also flew a blimp to 
communicate the height of the turbine. The blimp was borrowed from Stop Cambridge Wind Farm, a 
local group from Cambridge that also gave KWAG strategic advice.x In addition, KWAG set up and 
regularly updated a website and established relationships with two local newspapers (the Kent 
Messenger and the Kent and Sussex Courier) that consistently reported on the case. These early 
mobilisation efforts led to an established support base of 215 local families, who, in addition to 
being encouraged to write letters of objection to the local council, were kept up to date with events 
via regular emails. 
In mid-December, KWAG were contacted by Linton Park Plc., a food commodity company that 
sought to protect the value of a large property it owned in the area which it thought the wind 
turbine would threaten. After some discussion with Smith, the company decided to work with KWAG 
ďǇ ĐoŵŵissioŶiŶg aŶd fuŶdiŶg a plaŶŶiŶg ƌeďuttal doĐuŵeŶt to uŶdeƌŵiŶe the appliĐaŶt͛s Đase. To 
this end it hired the environmental consultants Waterman CPM Ltd. The planning rebuttal was 
eventually submitted to MBC in July 2008. Wind Direct made no attempt to engage with and inform 
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the local community about the project beyond statutory consultation, though they did set up 
information stalls in two nearby towns – Maidstone and Ashford – as a means of raising awareness 
of, and canvassing public opinion over, renewable energy.  
In the meantime, and with the rebuttal document taken care of, KWAG focused its attention 
elsewhere as a means of resisting the development. For the most part here, and after the initial 
mobilisation efforts of the core group, the campaign increasingly began to be coordinated and 
executed by Smith. Here, private politics now became central to the campaign. 
In late-December 2007, Smith ďegaŶ ǁƌitiŶg to eǆeĐutiǀes ǁithiŶ “aiŶsďuƌǇ͛s, iŶĐludiŶg the 
ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s CEO JustiŶ KiŶg, to iŶfoƌŵ theŵ that oŶe of his supplieƌs – the landowner – was planning 
to site a wind turbine that they believed threatened the health of local residents due to its proximity 
to their homes. Though executives did engage in correspondence with KWAG, including King, and 
eǆpƌessed soŵe sǇŵpathǇ ǁith the gƌoup͛s ĐoŶĐeƌŶs, ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ Ǉielded Ŷo substantive results 
in terms of outcomes.  
In addition, KWAG attempted to bring to the attention of Wind Direct and HG Capital, a private 
equity company whose direct investment (of £19 million) was funding the project, their belief that 
the deǀelopŵeŶt ǁas soĐiallǇ iƌƌespoŶsiďle. The ŵaiŶ thƌust of KWAG͛s aƌguŵeŶt ǁas that, based 
upon their own measurements, the proposed turbine was too close to the nearest dwelling and 
theƌefoƌe ĐoŶtƌaǀeŶed iŶdustƌǇ ďest pƌaĐtiĐe guideliŶes, WiŶd DiƌeĐt͛s oǁŶ poliĐies, and notions of 
corporate social responsibility that HG Capital purportedly adhered to.xi During these early 
exchanges of letters and emails, HG Capital and Wind Direct claimed their measurements were 
correct and that it was for local planners to decide on the application. However, KWAG continued to 
insist that it was their measurements that were correct and as a result threatened to inform the 
California State Teachers Retirement System (CalSTRS), a US investor in HG Capital, of poor 
corporate social responsibility practices relating to the proximity issue. Smith also threatened to 
11 
 
report HG Capital to the Institute of Chartered Accountants in respect of what he believed to be 
inaccurate audits relating to their investment in a wind turbine at Workington.  
While this exchange was going on, KWAG began corresponding with central government over what it 
believed to be a dubious decision by the Secretary of State relating to the development. With the 
submission of the application, Wind Direct had argued that an Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) was not necessary for a single turbine with limited environmental consequences. However, 
after seeking advice from Tunbridge Wells Borough Council and Kent Wildlife Trust, and carrying out 
its own scoping report,xii MBC insisted on an EIA, highlighting the potential for negative 
environmental externalities and evoking the precautionary principle. This decision led to Wind Direct 
appealing to the Secretary of State, who, afteƌ deliďeƌatioŶ, ďaĐked WiŶd DiƌeĐt͛s Đlaiŵ that aŶ EIA 
was not necessary.  
The “eĐƌetaƌǇ of “tate͛s deĐisioŶ led to sustaiŶed ĐoƌƌespoŶdeŶce between KWAG and national 
government, where the former sought reasons for this ruling. After a piecemeal and reluctant 
release of information, prompted by KWAG making use of the Freedom of Information Act, it 
became apparent that there were inconsistencies in information on the planning application 
submitted to MBC, and the information that Wind Direct had given to the Secretary of State relating 
to proximity to nearest dwellings and noise. KWAG informed both MBC and Wind Direct of the 
errors, which led to the latter attempting to submit amendments to the Council. However, MBC 
refused to accept these amendments and gave Wind Direct two options: first, submit an EIA under 
the current application as it stood; or second, withdraw the current application and submit a new 
application with the necessary amendments. Wind Direct subsequently withdrew the application 
pending resubmission. They also wrote to KWAG acknowledging their mistake. This process began in 
DeĐeŵďeƌ ϮϬϬϳ aŶd eŶded ǁith the appliĐatioŶ͛s ǁithdƌawal in October 2008.  
Given that Wind Direct was intending to resubmit its application, Smith made good on his threat to 
iŶfoƌŵ Cal“T‘“ of KWAG͛s ĐoŶĐeƌŶs, fiƌst ďǇ ǁƌitiŶg to the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s Đhief iŶǀestŵeŶt offiĐeƌ aŶd 
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then to its chairman. Having received no response from either, he contacted journalists from the 
Sacramento Bee, a well-known Californian newspaper. Afteƌ ƌeǀieǁiŶg KWAG͛s Đlaiŵs aŶd 
ĐoŶtaĐtiŶg Cal“T‘“, the “aĐƌaŵeŶto Bee puďlished aŶ aƌtiĐle iŶ August ϮϬϬϵ giǀiŶg ǀoiĐe to KWAG͛s 
concerns (Sacremento Bee 2009 – see below). Two weeks later, Wind Direct wrote to MBC informing 
them that it ǁould Ŷot ďe ƌesuďŵittiŶg its appliĐatioŶ. BeǇoŶd ĐitiŶg ͚ĐoŵŵeƌĐial ƌeasoŶs͛, the 
company was not willing to expand on motivations for withdrawal when interviewed.  
Despite WiŶd DiƌeĐt͛s ǁithdƌaǁal, the laŶdoǁŶeƌ set up a page on his website informing of his 
intention to find another developer, not least because of the suitable wind speeds in the area. In 
response, KWAG organised a petition amongst group members and other local residents threatened 
by the proposal asking him to reconsider. This petition was ignored and so the group set up an 
additional page on its website directly attacking the landowner and associated family businesses, in 
particular their claim to being intimately tied to and caring for the local area. At this point the 
landowner became very concerned about the negative publicity that the campaign would have on 
the faŵilǇ ďusiŶesses as ǁell as its ͚peƌsoŶal Ŷatuƌe͛. Heƌe, afteƌ soŵe ĐoƌƌespoŶdence with KWAG 
through an intermediary, he decided to scrap all attempts at siting a turbine on his land as long as 
KWAG ended their campaign. With this assurance the KWAG website closed and the campaign 
ended. In June 2011, the landowner was considering the possibility of photovoltaics as an alternative 
to wind generated electricity.  
Private Politics and the Marden Campaign 
͚MoǀeŵeŶts ŵaǇ ďe aďle to shop aƌouŶd for the most vulnerable targets…oƌ ƌapidlǇ sǁitĐh taƌgets 
according to perceived chances for suĐĐess…hoǁeǀeƌ defiŶed ďǇ aĐtiǀists. TaƌgetiŶg ŵultiple 
iŶstitutioŶs, ǁhile diffiĐult, ŵaǇ iŶĐƌease ĐhaŶĐes foƌ soĐial ĐhaŶge͛ ;AƌŵstƌoŶg aŶd BeƌŶsteiŶ ϮϬϬϴ: 
87) 
Armstrong and Bernstein here draw attention to the potential efficacy of a strategic approach that 
targets multiple institutions, particularly given that some might be more vulnerable than others to 
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campaign pressure. Clearly such an approach is evident in the Marden case, where not only did the 
campaign make use of both public (state focused) and private political strategies, but also targeted 
different institutions and actors within each of these arenas. Ultimately, this multi-strategic 
oƌieŶtatioŶ sought to ͚iŶĐƌease the ĐhaŶĐes foƌ soĐial ĐhaŶge͛, that is to saǇ, ĐaŵpaigŶ suĐĐess.  
The Marden campaign did manage to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in a number of targets, 
which eventually led to a successful outcome through the use of private politics. However, in what 
ways can the campaign be said to have deployed private politics? How can we explain the adoption 
and success of private politics in this case? Was private politics a sufficient condition of campaign 
success? And what are the implications of this atypical case for understanding local mobilization 
(against wind farms)? 
In a number of ways, the Marden case was typical of anti-wind farm activism. The campaign was a 
direct response within a community to a planned wind energy development, which led to efforts by 
a core group of residents to mobilise others against the project.xiii Residents established an identity 
through KWAG, which served as a locus and vehicle for the campaign. Initial strategic efforts 
concentrated on the local planning system, where KWAG followed the two-fold strategic approach 
identified above: persuasion and political pressure, which is unsurprising given advice from StopCWF 
and information from the Country Guardian. In terms of persuasion, KWAG directly lobbied MDC, 
and via its alliances with Linton Park PLC, submitted a professionally informed rebuttal document. In 
terms of political pressure, KWAG successfully mobilised a significant number of local constituents. 
In the course of the campaign MDC received some 300 letters of objection and saw 6 parish councils 
formally object.xiv 
In addition to these typical features, KWAG focused its state oriented gaze at the national level. Here 
the group made use of freedom of information law to ascertain why the Secretary of State had 
oǀeƌƌiddeŶ MDC͛s iŶsisteŶĐe oŶ aŶ EIA. DuƌiŶg a leŶgthǇ letteƌ ǁƌitiŶg eǆĐhaŶge it Đaŵe to light 
there were informational problems with the plaŶŶiŶg appliĐatioŶ, ǁhiĐh led to the appliĐatioŶ͛s 
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withdrawal by Wind Direct, who fully intended to amend and resubmit it. This was arguably a 
turning point in the campaign, which shall be returned to below. 
KWAG͛s use of pƌiǀate politiĐs that accompanied these state oriented efforts began with attempts to 
directly persuade economic actors with varying interests in the development that the project 
contravened commitments to ethical business practices. The following examples of KWAG 
correspondence illustrate this point: 
͚The faĐt that [the deǀelopŵeŶt site] has ďeeŶ pƌoposed ďǇ the laŶdoǁŶeƌ aŶd seleĐted ďǇ WiŶd 
Direct demonstrates the lack of interest those two parties have in being socially responsible…The faĐt 
that WiŶd DiƌeĐt feel that theǇ ĐaŶ pƌoĐeed ǁith this site…deŵoŶstƌates that Ǉou, as fiŶaŶĐial 
backers, have not imposed your own broader criteria which you would be quite entitled to do as a 
socially responsible financial institution͛ ;Letteƌ to Toŵ MuƌleǇ, Head of Investments/Renewable 
Energy, HgCapital, October 2007 – emphasis added). 
͚Mƌ KiŶg Đlaiŵs that ͞…social, environment and ethical concerns should remain at the core of how we 
do things.͟ These ǁoƌds aƌe pƌesuŵaďlǇ ŵoƌe thaŶ just a puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs exercise and, if they have 
any substance, one would expect that it is precisely in a situation such as the one at present that 
those ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ Coƌpoƌate ‘espoŶsiďilitǇ at “aiŶsďuƌǇ͛s ǁould step up to the plate aŶd Ŷot 
ignore the evidence presented to theŵ͛ ;Letteƌ to AŶŶa Foƌd, Chaiƌ, Corporate Responsibility 
Coŵŵittee, “aiŶsďuƌǇ͛s, MaƌĐh ϮϬϬϵ – original emphasis). 
͚‘eadiŶg the Cal“T‘“ ͞Statement of Investment Responsibility͟ it is Đleaƌ to ŵe that Ǉou ǁould 
expect the managers of funds in which you invest to make sure that investment criteria are set 
which match your own philosophy in respect of social obligations. My belief, in this particular case is 
that Ǉour staŶdards iŶ respeĐt of ͞“oĐial iŶjurǇ͟ are Ŷot ďeiŶg ŵet…If Ǉouƌ ĐoŶĐlusioŶ is that I aŵ 
correct in believing that such an investment proposal would not meet your criteria perhaps you 
could encourage [HG Capital] to adopt investment criteria which are more aligned to your 
expectations. I strongly believe that, if this were to be done, it would result in the site in question 
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being deseleĐted aŶd the alleǀiatioŶ of a ĐoŶsideƌaďle aŵouŶt of tƌauŵa͛ ;Letteƌ to ‘ogeƌ Kozďeƌg, 
Chair – CalSTRS Investment Committee, April 2008 – emphasis added). 
As can be seen here, KWAG aimed to persuade economic actors of the inappropriateness of the 
development by deploying frames that sought to align with commitments to social and 
environmentally responsible business practices. Here the message was consistent: the project is 
socially/environmentally damaging, and your interest in the development contravenes your 
commitment to being an ethical business. However, as acknowledged earlier, such direct appeals 
failed to aĐhieǀe theiƌ aiŵs. Though “aiŶsďuƌǇ͛s aŶd HG Capital did engage with KWAG, none were 
persuaded by their arguments. And representatives from CalSTRS failed to respond to 
correspondence.  
IŶdeed, eǀideŶĐe suggests that it ǁas oŶlǇ at the poiŶt that KWAG͛s ethical arguments served to 
potentially harm the business interests of certain actors, not least through reputational damage, 
that they managed to achieve some leverage. Here coverage of the story in the Sacramento Bee and 
the direct public attack on the landowner were (likely) central. Coverage in the former read:  
͚As if a $ϰϮ ďillioŶ loss oŶ its iŶǀestŵeŶts iŶ the past fisĐal Ǉeaƌ ǁasŶ͛t eŶough, Ŷoǁ Cal“T‘“ is 
getting blowback for its stake in a proposed 420-foot-tall wind turbine in the English countryside. 
Hoping to block the project, activists in the county of Kent are appealing to the West Sacramento-
ďased peŶsioŶ fuŶd’s poliĐies agaiŶst soĐiallǇ irrespoŶsiďle iŶǀestŵeŶts. [Smith], a former investment 
ďaŶkeƌ ǁho heads the KeŶtish Wealde AĐtioŶ Gƌoup, saǇs the CalifoƌŶia “tate TeaĐheƌs͛ ‘etiƌeŵeŶt 
System ought to demand that wind projects supported by its investment dollars meet certain 
environmental standards…͞We’d eǆpeĐt, ǁith all Cal“TR“ saǇs aďout soĐial iŶjurǇ, that theǇ’d ďe 
applying the responsible end of the standard,͟ [“ŵith] said͛ ;“aĐƌaŵento Bee 2009 – emphasis 
added). 
The extent to which coverage in the Sacramento Bee impacted on the outcome at Marden is 
inconclusive. By the time the article had been published, Wind Direct had withdrawn its application 
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due to measurement inconsistencies over proximity to dwellings pending resubmission, and during 
interview the company would oŶlǇ giǀe ͚ĐoŵŵeƌĐial ƌeasoŶs͛ as their motivation for withdrawing. 
Nevertheless, the timing of the announcement that the developer would not be resubmitting their 
application closely followed the coverage in the Sacramento Bee. CalSTRS may well have pressured 
HgCapital to withdraw.  
In addition to publicly attacking the ƌeputatioŶ of Cal“T‘“, KWAG͛s adoptioŶ of this stƌategǇ toǁaƌds 
the landowner ultimately led to his withdrawal from the scheme. After Wind Direct pulled out of the 
project, the landowner publicly declared he would be seeking to work with an alternative wind 
energy developer. After a failed attempt to petition the landowner, KWAG dedicated a page on its 
website to publically attacking his reputation. Central to this page was the following: 
͚The [laŶdoǁŶeƌ͛s] ǁeďsite pƌoudlǇ pƌoĐlaiŵs: ͚"Three Generations" Caring for the Garden of 
EŶglaŶd for ŵore thaŶ a ĐeŶturǇ…As respoŶsiďle laŶdoǁŶers aŶd Đoŵŵitted ĐoŶservationists we feel 
ďeholdeŶ to aĐt positiǀelǇ ǁithiŶ the ǁider ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ…This is a ŵoǀe that eǆaĐtlǇ fits ďoth the 
persoŶal philosophǇ of the oǁŶer aŶd oǀerall philosophǇ of the ďusiŶess’. Some might justifiably 
argue that the stated intention of the [compaŶǇ͛s] diƌeĐtoƌs to opeŶ up theiƌ ĐoƌŶeƌ of the GaƌdeŶ of 
England to industrial wind turbine development for the sake of a few thousand pounds a year, is a 
break with that caring  tradition…HgCapital aŶd WiŶd DiƌeĐt haǀe pulled the plug oŶ the oƌigiŶal 
appliĐatioŶ. This giǀes the [laŶdoǁŶeƌ] aŶ oppoƌtuŶitǇ to ǁithdƌaǁ gƌaĐefullǇ…We hope this 
webpage will encourage [him] to reflect carefully on the consequences of [his] aĐtioŶs…aŶd that [he] 
ǁill deĐide to ĐoŶfiƌŵ oŶĐe aŶd foƌ all that…the ďlight [is]…ƌeŵoǀed͛ ;KWAG ǁeďsite, MaƌĐh ϮϬϭϬ – 
emphasis added). 
KWAG͛s puďliĐ attaĐk oŶ the ƌeputatioŶ of the laŶdoǁŶeƌ put the fiŶal Ŷail iŶ the ĐoffiŶ of the 
pƌoposed deǀelopŵeŶt at MaƌdeŶ. CoŶĐeƌŶed foƌ the iŵpaĐt of KWAG͛s aƌtiĐle oŶ the faŵilǇ 
business, the landowner dropped his plans to site a wind energy development on his land. The 
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ĐoŶteŶtioŶ oǀeƌ the MaƌdeŶ ǁiŶd faƌŵ had eŶded. KWAG͛s puďliĐ politiĐs stƌategǇ had ultimately 
prevailed. How can we explain this trajectory and success? 
The peculiar trajectory of the Marden campaign can be explained by a conjunction of the contingent 
nature of the local context and the specific resources at the disposal of KWAG, and particularly the 
gƌoup͛s leadeƌ. These faĐtoƌs affeĐted the ĐaŵpaigŶ iŶ tǁo ǁaǇs: FiƌstlǇ, iŶ teƌŵs of Đontext, 18 
months into the campaign KWAG was contacted by a Linton Park PLC, which was keen to protect the 
value of its property. The resulting alliance led to the company commissioning and funding a rebuttal 
document that was submitted to MBC in an effort to uŶdeƌŵiŶe the appliĐaŶt͛s Đase. This ǁas a 
significant development. Prior research has highlighted that commissioning rebuttal documents has 
featured in other instances of activism against wind farms, and that activists can dedicate 
considerable time and energy raising the funds to pay for the contribution of planning specialists as 
well as hiring other experts to help fight cases (e.g. barristers at public inquiries) (Ogilvie 2013; 
Ogilvie and Rootes 2015). That a local business had agreed to take care of this aspect of the 
campaign meant that Smith could concentrate more squarely on a strategy oriented towards private 
politics. Here then, a contingent aspect of the local context contributed to providing Smith with the 
space to make the most of his time, skills and experience in pursuing economic actors. That political 
opportunity structures are central in understanding the development and outcomes of contentious 
politics is generally accepted within the literature (Kriesi 2007). That contingent opportunities are 
influential in understanding the trajectory and outcomes of contention is also acknowledged (Rootes 
1997). Such opportunities were certainly influential in the development and outcomes at Marden.  
If local context served to influence developments, so too did resources, not least the fact that Smith 
was retired and had enjoyed a career in finance and accounting. Retirement gave Smith a 
considerable amount of time to dedicate to the campaign and certainly influenced his ability to lead 
KWAG and steer the group in his desired direction. In addition, his past career and understanding of 
the business world influenced his adoption of a corporate focused strategy, grounded in the belief 
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that such a strategy would yield the desired results. In effect, the cultural resources garnered from a 
Đoƌpoƌate Đaƌeeƌ gaǀe “ŵith a ĐoŶsideƌaďle ͚feel foƌ the gaŵe͛, ǁhiĐh ultiŵatelǇ pƌoǀed suĐĐessful iŶ 
aĐhieǀiŶg KWAG͛s aiŵs. OŶ this poiŶt, AƌŵstƌoŶg aŶd BeƌŶsteiŶ ǁƌite:  
͚ChalleŶges aƌe ŵoƌe likelǇ to suĐĐeed if aĐtiǀists haǀe a ͞feel foƌ the gaŵe.͟ ChalleŶgeƌs aƌe 
ofteŶ…iŶdiǀiduals stƌuĐtuƌallǇ liŶked to the iŶstitutioŶ iŶ ƋuestioŶ. Tƌue outsideƌs laĐk the kŶoǁledge 
needed to identify the vulnerabilities of particular institutions. Insiders are thus expected to play a 
role in challenges, either through initiating challenges or providing resources and information to 
eǆteƌŶal ĐhalleŶgeƌs. Those ǁith the ďest ͞feel foƌ the gaŵe͟ should ďe aďle to Ŷaǀigate the aƌeŶa 
suĐĐessfullǇ…Thus, it is Ŷot suƌpƌisiŶg that soŵe ƌeseaƌĐheƌs haǀe fouŶd that change is often 
iŶitiated ďǇ those ǁho aƌe siŵultaŶeouslǇ iŶsideƌs aŶd outsideƌs͛ ;ϮϬϬϴ: ϴϱͿ. 
Smith clearly occupied this insider-outsider status, aŶd his ͚feel foƌ the gaŵe͛ Ŷot oŶlǇ iŶflueŶĐed his 
commitment towards private politics, but also his strategic orientation within this arena. Here KWAG 
targeted multiple institutions and actors in its search for vulnerabilities and leverage. Central to this 
appƌoaĐh ǁas a fƌaŵiŶg stƌategǇ that sought ͚fƌaŵe aligŶŵeŶt͛ ǁith ĐoŵpaŶies͛ ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts 
towards social and environmental responsibility. The ŵaiŶ task of fƌaŵe aligŶŵeŶt ͚is foƌ ŵoǀeŵeŶt 
leaders to develop and articulate collective action frame[s] and align [them] with the belief system[s] 
of those ǁhoŵ theǇ ǁish to ŵoďilize͛ ;Moƌƌis ϮϬϬϰ: ϮϯϵͿ. CoŵpaŶies͛ claims to ethical business 
pƌaĐtiĐe ĐleaƌlǇ offeƌed a ͚disĐuƌsiǀe oppoƌtuŶitǇ͛, that is, ͚ideas iŶ the ďƌoadeƌ politiĐal Đultuƌe 
ďelieǀed to ďe ͞seŶsiďle,͟ ͞ƌealistiĐ,͟ aŶd ͞legitiŵate͟ aŶd ǁhose pƌeseŶĐe ǁould thus faĐilitate 
reception of specific forms of ĐolleĐtiǀe aĐtioŶ fƌaŵiŶg͛ ;MĐCaŵŵoŶ ϮϬϭϯͿ. Understanding their 
poteŶtial foƌ leǀeƌage, “ŵith sought to aligŶ KWAG͛s fƌaŵes ǁith a cultural context diffuse with 
businesses͛ ethical claims, first by making direct appeals to the companies, and then going public 
with the potential for reputational damage. Interestingly, Ricketts notes that direct ethical appeals 
can be effective in corporate campaigning. However, when such appeals fail, it is the potential for 
economic harm can that be decisive in understanding the impact of strategic framing (Ricketts 2013: 
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6-9). This was certainly the case at Marden. When ethical persuasion failed, KWAG ͚went public͛ with 
their concerns. The potential reputational damage and related economic consequences served to 
(likely in the case of CalSTRS) leverage the desired outcome. “ŵith͛s ͚feel foƌ the gaŵe͛, derived 
from his cultural resources, was clearly decisive here.  
Judged against the ideal-typical backdrop of anti-windfarm activism then, with a predominant focus 
on persuading and pressuring local authorities to refuse permission for planned projects, the extent 
and success of private politics at Marden sets this case apart. However, though these two strategic 
orientations have been largely separated in this article for reasons of analytical exposition in relation 
to particular questions, there are potentially important interactions and parallels to note. Firstly, 
Wind Direct withdrew its planning application as a result of KWAG exposing measurement problems 
via a state focused strategy (freedom of information requests etc.). Did this withdrawal make the 
development more vulnerable to the impact of private politics? Might Wind Direct have been more 
recalcitrant had the application been more secure? Was the appliĐatioŶ͛s ǁithdƌawal a necessary 
condition of success in this case? These questions are difficult to aŶsǁeƌ giǀeŶ the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s 
reluctance to divulge information. But they do raise intriguing questions as to the potential 
interaction between public and private politics. Understanding the relationship between these two 
strategic approaches when they appear together in a particular instance of contention is certainly an 
avenue to pursue in future research.   
In addition, there is an interesting parallel to draw between these two strategic orientations and 
outcomes. This relates to the ideal-typical two-fold strategy associated with securing planning 
refusal noted earlier. What is interesting here is that this two-fold approach is reflected in the 
business focused campaign at Marden, where strategic framing efforts involved first persuasion and 
then pressure. Moreover, the fact that the potential reputational damage of public facing discourse 
was more significant in influencing outcomes at Marden than direct discursive engagement to an 
extent reflects research into the variable impact of these strategies on planning decisions. In relation 
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to that research, Ogilvie (2013) has pointed out that mobilization of local constituents is likely the 
most effective strategy in influencing locally elected decision-makers. Faced with the potential fall-
out of appƌoǀiŶg loĐallǇ uŶpopulaƌ deǀelopŵeŶts, ͚politiĐal logiĐ͛ diĐtates that eleĐted plaŶŶiŶg 
committee members will at times be inclined to reject proposals. Similarly, when businesses are 
faced with the potential consequences of reputationally damaging campaign frames, ͚eĐoŶoŵiĐ 
logiĐ͛ diĐtates ŵoƌe faǀouƌaďle outĐoŵes foƌ aĐtiǀists. IŶ ďoth Đases, iŶteƌests tƌuŵp the poǁeƌ of 
argumentation. 
Conclusion 
This article has described and explained an atypical case of anti-wind farm activism in England. It has 
argued that the centrality, extent and success of private politics in the Marden campaign serves to 
differentiate it from others. This campaign trajectory has been explained in terms of a combination 
of context and resources that led to the targeting of multiple corporate actors via frames that sought 
to aligŶ ǁith ďusiŶesses͛ Đlaiŵs to soĐial aŶd eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ. WheŶ diƌeĐt appeals to 
economic actors on this basis failed, KWAG managed to secure success by ͚going public͛ with their 
frames. The key means of leverage here was the potential economic consequences of reputational 
damage to businesses.   
Demonstrating the use and impact of private politics at the local level, the Marden case offers 
something new to our understanding of anti-windfarm activism, community contention more 
generally, and private politics, where research has tended to focus on national and transnational 
activism. Local anti-windfarm (and other anti-infrastructure) campaigns are typically fought through 
planning systems, but the KWAG campaign demonstrates an alternative route to resist unwanted 
developments at the local level. 
Pƌiǀate politiĐs is paƌt of ͚a Ŷeǁ paƌadigŵ foƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg soĐial ŵoǀeŵeŶts͛ (Armstrong and 
Bernstein 2008: 91) and contentious politics more generally. Yet as a distinct means of contention, 
͚the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of pƌiǀate politiĐs [still] ƌeŵaiŶs to ďe estaďlished͛ ;BaƌoŶ ϮϬϬϯ: ϲϰͿ, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ 
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given suspicions that the majority of such campaigns fail. Clearly far more research needs to be done 
in what is an area of increasing interest to scholars of contentious politics. Analysing an example of 
successful private politics at the local level, the Marden case offers an interesting contribution to this 
developing body of work.   
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i Private politics involves efforts to resolve conflict without recourse to state power (see below). 
ii Occasionally quantitative data are given, e.g. level of campaign support and number of objection to the local 
authority, but these are simply to aid the description of the case. 
iii The research design in no way involved participant observation however. 
iv Interviewees referred to by name have been anonymised. 
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v Armstrong and Bernstein use the teƌŵ ͚ŵulti-iŶstitutioŶal politiĐs͛, ǁhiĐh is a ďƌoadeƌ ĐoŶĐept thaŶ pƌiǀate 
politics that incorporates state and non-state oriented challenges. The above quote comes from a discussion of 
non-state oriented conflict and thus squares with the idea of private politics.   
vi Perhaps the best-kŶoǁŶ eǆaŵple of suĐh aĐtiǀisŵ iŶ the eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal pƌotest liteƌatuƌe is GƌeeŶpeaĐe͛s 
suĐĐessful ĐaŵpaigŶ agaiŶst “hell͛s iŶteŶtioŶ to dispose of the BƌeŶt “paƌ at sea iŶ the ŵid-1990s. Beyond the 
environment, anti-sweatshop activism, not least against the well-known sports brand Nike, is another notable 
example. 
vii Refusals by local authorities to grant planning permission can lead to an appeal by a developer and a public 
inquiry, which is facilitated by a nationally based planning inspector. Here campaign strategy focuses on 
persuasion as planning inspectors are not subject to local political pressures. 
viii A ƌeďuttal doĐuŵeŶt is a diƌeĐt ƌespoŶse to a deǀelopeƌ͛s plaŶŶiŶg appliĐatioŶ aŶd eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal 
statement. It sets out the case why an application should not be approved. 
ix Anemometer masts measure wind speeds. 
x KWAG also garnered information for the Country Guardian, a national organization that supports local anti-
wind farm campaigners. 
xi KWAG argued the distance was less thaŶ ϱϲϬ ŵeteƌs. WiŶd DiƌeĐt Đlaiŵed it ǁas ϲϱϬŵ. WiŶd DiƌeĐt͛s 
policies and industry guidelines suggest that the nearest dwelling to a turbine should be 750m. 
xii A scoping report is intended to ascertain the necessity, content and extent of an environmental impact 
assessment. 
xiii The KWAG campaign was also broadly similar to other campaigns against wind farms in terms of 
organizational structure (a core group with a clear leader), size of core group and membership, and number of 
objections raised with the local authority (see Ogilvie 2013: 119-20). It is interesting to note that this roughly 
equivalent level of mobilization developed in response to a single turbine. Other cases have typically involved 
larger multi-turbine projects. 
xiv Parish Council opinions are often taken as proxy indicators of community discontent by local authorities 
(Toke 2005). 
